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1. Introduction
The focus of this paper is the importance of issues of governance in 
the context of local sustainable development. An aim is to identify some 
important challenges in research on urban and rural agro-food Sys­
tems. First, within this context, the importance of setting priorities in 
local sustainable development is discussed. Second, the relation be- 
tween good governance and local sustainable development is elabo- 
rated. Third, two case studies on the importance of institutions for food 
ąuality and the relation between ąuality enforcement mechanisms and 
governance structures in the food supply system are presented. Finally, 
some issues of the relation between investment, economic activity and 
sustainable development are discussed. An important finding is that 
analysis of governance structures and of stakeholders’ interests of is of 
crucial importance for achieving local sustainable development in the 
agro-food system. This may lead to the identification of priorities in the 
process of sustainable development, while the identification of factors 
in the institutional environment and governance structures that may 
hamper such development makes it morę likely that change will be suc- 
cessful.
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2. Local sustainable development in the context 
of the agro-food system - setting priorities
Kistkowski [2004, 87] defines sustainable development as “a global de- 
velopment process which minimises the consumption of natural re- 
sources and limits the factors that harm the environment, through pro- 
cesses of improving the economy and raising the standard of living.” 
Although this definition has some weaknesses, it highlights some impor- 
tant aspects of local sustainable development within the context of the 
agro-food system. From this definition it is not elear whether minimising 
natural resource use or raising the standard of living has priority. It is 
also not elear whether the use of natural resources may inerease or not, 
i.e. whether strong sustainability (leaving ecological Capital intact for fu­
turę generations) or weak sustainability (ecological Capital may be sub- 
stituted by, for example, physical Capital) is advocated. However, it 
clearly shows the importance of setting priorities [see Lomborg, 2004]. 
Although it may be difficult to establish priorities, it is necessary to do 
so for practical reasons. Improvement of everything at the same moment 
is impossible. Furthermore, some aims of sustainability are easier to 
achieve and/or may be regarded as morę important.
Why should we prioritise? Can we say that one problem is morę ur- 
gent than another? As Lomborg argues, the economic reason for 
prioritisation is simple and crude. As scarcity exists (factors of produc- 
tion are limited while human wants are rather unlimited), we have to 
make choices. We cannot do everything at the same time. For many peo- 
ple such reasoning may be unacceptable, which hampers prioritisation. 
But “[i]f we don’t [prioritize] we end up doing less well that we otherwise 
could have done [2004, 2]”. The following basie economic ąuestions ap- 
pear: what to do, how to do it, when, where, for whom, by whom and how 
much. The problem of choice may be a cruel one. Lomborg, using data 
from Hahn [1996, 236], gives the example of new medical treatments 
that may cost several millions of dollars to save one human life a year, 
while in a third world country this would cost 62 dollars. However, on 
the local level there are also many examples. On one hand public money 
may be used for not always useful investments, or just be wasted, while 
on the other hand ill people cannot be treated in hospital. It seems to be 
elear that the issue of governance is essential here.
Flynn and Netherwood [2004] argue that the language we use is not 
the most important, but that the principles of sustainable development 
are Integrated into local development strategies. Many people may not 
understand or misunderstand the term sustainable development. At 
such a moment the use of terms such as ąuality of life or well-being may
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be morę useful. According to the authors “[t]he terms well-being and sus- 
tainable development can be interchanged provided that the former is 
used to mean the simultaneous meeting of economic, social and environ- 
mental goals. Meeting one or two of these goals may not be sustainable. 
[2004, 9]” Thus, for local sustainable development it may be important to 
carry out research on perceptions of sustainable development and re- 
lated words with similar meaning, as for action it is important to create 
a common language.
According to Flynn and Netherwood, sustainable development means 
meeting social, economic and environmental goals. An interesting and 
difficult ąuestion is whether there may be a trade-off between different 
goals. May one goal be achieved at the cost of another goal, or should 
only a kind of Pareto-improvement be allowed, where, for example, an 
economic goal may only be achieved without deteriorating environmen- 
tal or social aspects? In order to answer this ąuestion, analysis is needed 
on a case-to-case basis of specific elements of all three generał goals. For 
example, can an increase in environmental pollution be accepted for the 
sake of an increase in production? In fact, such a trade-off is accepted in 
reality, while many limits are set on pollution. A discussion on this issue 
is of great importantance, as in many developing countries solving the 
poverty problem may be priority number 1, while the environment or so­
cial issues (e.g. democracy) are neglected. Establishment of goals and 
which trade-offs are acceptable and which are not is necessary in order 
to establish a proper sustainable development policy, as the reality of 
the market does not really take environmental issues into consideration, 
as well as many other important issues of which the benefits are rather 
indirect or long-term. When talking about urban and rural agro-food Sys­
tems as a factor of local sustainable development, an important ąuestion 
is whether development of one part of the system may be at the cost of 
another part of the system. May poorer rural areas develop at the cost of 
developed urban areas? Which criteria should be taken into consider­
ation? Which trade-offs are allowed? This is an issue that needs deeper 
research.
Lomborg [2004] discusses the importance of the prioritisation of global 
issues. “On the national level we have well-established institutions and 
procedures (government and appropriate laws) that force us to make 
these choices morę clearly”. “[T]here may be strong institutional rigidity 
to prioritization between different agencies [2004, 1].” Thus, on the 
global level competencies are not clearly defined, hampering the setting 
of priorities. However, this issue is also important for local sustainable 
development priorities. It is impossible to analyse and achieve local 
sustainability without taking global processes into consideration, as
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each region is to a greater or lesser extent part of the global economy 
and is influenced by processes of globalisation. Furthermore, local au- 
thorities, who should know best what should happen in order to achieve 
sustainability, as in generał they have morę information than central 
government agencies, have often limited competencies and have to deal 
with priorities set by central government agencies. The problem de- 
scribed by Lomborg appears when it is not elear which central govern- 
ment agency or ministry is responsible for what. This problem may be 
especially relevant to former socialist countries, as many competencies 
have not been clarified yet. While EU accession on the one hand may 
make things less elear, as EU rules have to be interpreted and applied 
first, this may positively influence matters, as the EU has a morę stable 
institutional framework than the former socialist countries. Trans- 
ferring competencies to local authorities and stimulating the participa- 
tion of the population may be effective when they make use of their 
greater knowledge of the local situation. However, as Rose-Ackerman 
[2004, 316] writes: “morę anthropologically informed work suggests lim- 
its to participatory models in hierarchical rural societies. Decentralisa- 
tion can be an invitation to local corruption and self-dealing if not man- 
aged effectively.” As Brown [2001, see Rose-Ackerman, 2004, 319] 
argues, there is a learning process in exercising responsibility, thus it 
takes time before people who are not used to political power can do this. 
Thus, good governance is of crucial importance for local sustainable de- 
velopment. This is elaborated in morę detail in Section 3.
There is the question of who sets priorities. The argument here is sim- 
ilar to the argument regarding dangers when trying to introduce morę 
efficient institutions. As there may be high transaction costs for obtain- 
ing appropriate information, strong interest groups may exist (e.g. lobby- 
ing for unsustainable measures which are advantageous to them, but 
disadvantageous to society as a whole), and inereasing sustainability has 
features of a public good (non-excludability and non-rivalry in consump- 
tion), measures may be taken that do not promote sustainability [see 
Platje, 2004].
With respect to improving sustainability in the agro-food system, pri­
orities for improvement should be set. General information should be 
collected on stakeholders and stakeholder involvement, existing ur- 
ban-rural links in the food logistic chain and information on issues such 
as market structures (no. of enterprises, market share), property rights 
structure, value-added created, employment and income, income distri- 
bution, poverty and access to decent food at reasonable prices, output, lo- 
cation, area covered, import / export, share in sector output, institutional 
environment (e.g. quality requirements and enforcement), infrastruc-
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turę, environmental impact of production and consumption activities, 
awareness, etc. [see Platje and Kałasznik, 2005]. This should create the 
base for analysing whether “agro-food districts” can be a tool for local 
sustainable development, especially in former socialist countries where, 
generally speaking, many rural areas were negatively affected by the 
system transformation. The idea of “agro-food districts”, developed by 
Barbara Despiney-Żochowska [2004], is based on the development of 
smali and medium sized firms and farms, which traditionally create 
morę employment than large enterprises.
Within this context, analysis of income and employment generation 
within agriculture itself is relevant, as this activity is based in rural ar­
eas, and shows a tendency to lag behind when the total economy grows. 
Agriculture contributes about 3% to the GDP of the old EU, while creat- 
ing 5% of total employment, although this percentage is declining. As 
Kelly [2004] argues, the large subsidies (about half of the EU budget) 
may be too costly and bureaucracy wasteful, while globał competitive- 
ness is declining. However, although creating a smali part of GDP, while 
the output per worker (and as a result income) is lower than in other 
sectors, a question remains as to whether this is bad for rural areas 
where unemployment is high. An important point is increasing rural in­
come and creating jobs. In this field basie food Processing and distribu- 
tion and the creation of local markets may be effective, as here higher 
value added is created and the barriers on the international markets 
may be too large. Without state intervention, traditional farming has 
a tendency to inerease in scalę, while employment decreases. Thus, 
so-called multifunctional rural development [see Sokołowska, 2004] 
based on the development of food-processing and services in rural areas 
and “agro-food districts” and provision of logistics services may be an op- 
portunity. For example, food products such as bread may be produced in 
rural areas or smaller towns, while the producer sets up a distribution 
chain in urban areas, where the demand is the largest.
3. Good governance
New Institutional Economics (NIE) looks at the influence of formal 
rules of the gamę (e.g. property rights), informal rules of the gamę (e.g. 
culture, mental models) and enforcement of the rules of the gamę by 
what Platje [2004] calls “institutional governance” (organisational struc- 
tures such as the judiciary, police, tax office, government agencies, etc.) 
on economic activity (carried out by governance structures, where the 
“play of the gamę” takes place). The institutional environment (formal 
and informal institutions, “institutional governance”) together with
2— Urban...
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“hardware” (e.g. infrastructure, Information systems) and transaction 
costs (the costs of concluding, monitoring and er. forcing an exchange or 
transaction) determine which governance structures are most effective.
An important ąuestion is how the institutional environment stimu- 
lates the achievement of the goals of the system. The aim of a company, 
in generał, is short-term profit, which is often in contradiction with sus- 
tainable development, as it may be at the expense of the environment 
(negative external effects) and standard of living for workers (e.g. Iow 
wages, job uncertainty, unemployment). The aim of society may be an 
improvement in the standard of living. This is very often measured by 
real disposable income, access to education and health care, and so on. 
So income distribution is relevant, and a ąuestion is whether the “trickle 
down” effect of economic growth, where the benefits are distributed 
among society as a whole, and not among a smali group, functions. How- 
ever, the focus of the system is often on economic activity, while social 
and environmental issues receive lower priority. Priorities are set by the 
institutional environment. They can be written down in laws, but also be 
culturally determined. A ąuestion is whether the priorities set by or ex- 
isting in the institutional environment stimulate sustainable develop- 
ment. When this is not the case, what should be done to change this? In 
short, to analyse this the focal point of NIE analysis should change from 
factors stimulating economic activity as such to factors stimulating sus­
tainable economic activity. In order to achieve sustainable development, 
good governance is reąuired, as even when new rules are set, they still 
have to be implemented.
Rose-Ackerman [2004, 301] defines good governance as anti-corrup- 
tion campaigns, incentives to work efficiently and the lack of possibili- 
ties for smali interest groups or elites “to capture the State and exert ex- 
cess influence on policy”. Corruption, “the misuse of public power for 
private or political gains” [2004, 301], in generał negatively influences 
economic performance, as well as sustainable development. Further- 
more, corruption creates an interest in the existing status quo, and pow- 
erful groups may defend their vested interests.
“Some reforms, if well designed and implemented, would have large benefits 
and very Iow costs. Unfortunately, they also have serious distribution effects, 
and those who gain from the status quo are freąuently powerful economic and 
political actors capable of blocking reforms. [Rose-Ackerman, 2004, 302]”
Thus, when aiming at changes in the agro-food system in the direction 
of local sustainable development, corruption on different levels of the 
government should be taken into account.
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As Rose-Ackerman [2004, 304] argues, good governance has a two-way 
relationship with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. On the one 
hand, good governance is related to an increase in GDP per capita. Cor- 
ruption tends to hamper investment, as transaction costs and uncer- 
tainty are likely to increase. Furthermore, the informal economy may ex- 
pand. Due to corruption, enforcement of formal institutions such as 
property rights is less elear, and as a result morę value finds itself in the 
public domain. This means that property rights are unclearly defined or 
delineated and that economic actors have a stronger incentive to spend 
resources to obtain value out of the public domain by way of obtaining 
such property rights. In other words, as Platje [2004, 30] argues: “In 
generał, the higher the transaction costs, the larger the value in the pub­
lic domain. Conseąuently, there are morę opportunities for rent-seeking, 
stronger incentives for redistributive activity and weaker incentives for 
productive activity.” Thus, even when the local government is not cor- 
rupt, the economic system in the country as a whole is of importance, as 
much depends on the functioning of e.g. the judiciary and central govern- 
ment. On the other hand, when GDP per capita inereases, the demand 
for democracy, transparency and integrity of the government may in­
crease. This last point may be an argument for corrupt officials to im- 
pede reforms. Generally speaking, corruption is an indication of a weak 
economic system, where transaction costs may be high and incentives for 
sustainable productive activities weak.
Rose-Ackerman [2004, 310, based on Crook and Manor, 1998, 42 and 
Swamy et al., 2001] gives a strong argument for the importance of fe- 
male involvement in issues of sustainable development. Survey evidence 
suggests that when morę females participate in government, the level of 
corruption is lower, as women in generał have a morę negative (or less 
positive) attitude to corruption than men.
The vested interest argument was related to corruption. However, any 
change in a system has redistributive effeets. Some people gain, while 
other may gain less or even lose when something changes, even in the 
case of no corruption. Thus, an analysis of what stakeholders gain and 
lose from a change is important, in order to develop a path of change 
that tries to give as many people as possible an interest in the change 
(incentive-compatibility). Furthermore, people may not be aware of the 
advantages or disadvantages of certain changes. Making people con- 
scious of costs and benefits is an essential element in changing a system 
successfully. It is rather obvious that when we make people aware of ad- 
vantages, they may be morę likely to support change. However, it also 
may be beneficial to make people aware of disadvantages. This is a com- 
plex issue. On the one hand, people may stop supporting change when
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they become aware of disadvantages that touch themselves directly. But 
if they realise later, when the change has started, that they lose some- 
thing, they may be inclined to hamper the process of change in sonie 
way, so the outcome will not be as desired. A problem that remains to be 
solved is not only that short-term and direct benefits or costs are morę 
foften taken into consideration than indirect and long-term costs and 
benefits, but also the individual assessment of costs and benefits.
4. Two case studies: institutions and food ąuality;
ąuality enforcement mechanisms
and governance structures in food supply Systems
4.1. Formal rules guaranteeing food ąuality 
and safety may have adverse effects
An article by Azevedo and Bankuti [2002] gives an example of how in- 
efficient “institutional governance” and high transaction costs may lead 
to a decrease in food safety with the introduction of food ąuality stan- 
dards (formal rules). An important issue is the costs of complying to for­
mal rules. There are transaction costs for producers in order to fulfil 
ąuality standards. On the other hand, there are costs for an agency mon­
itoring whether producers fulfil the standards. Added to this, when new 
rules are introduced, there is always uncertainty about the exact inter- 
pretation of the rules, while producers and agencies that should monitor 
and enforce these rules (“institutional governance”) may negotiate on 
their interpretation. Thus, there may be high transaction costs con- 
nected with the fulfilment of ąuality standards, which together with 
a weak enforcement mechanism gives incentives for activity in informal 
markets. A feature of many food products is that they are rather homo- 
geneous. This creates a problem of asymmetric information, as the prod- 
uct itself does not provide the consumer with information on whether he 
is buying in the formal or informal market. In such a situation, the mar­
ket for ecological food products may completely disappear (adverse selec- 
tion) and eco-labelling may be completely ineffective, as the monitoring 
of the labełling fails. Informal food markets negatively influence eco- 
nomic activity, as the difficulty to enforce property rights in court, due to 
the illegal naturę of the business, hampers investment and creates diffi- 
culties in enforcing contracts. Furthermore, access to Capital markets is 
limited while the time-horizon taken into consideration for investments 
and activities shortens. Finally, there may be a large social cost in the 
form of lower food ąuality, threatening public health.
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4.2. Food ąuality enforcement mechanisms 
and governance of food supply Systems
Raynaud et al [2005] in their article “Alignment between Quality En­
forcement Devices and Governance Structures in the Agro-food Vertical 
Chains” put forward the generał hypothesis that the governance structure 
that exists in the agro-food supply chain is determined by the type of 
ąuality enforcement mechanisms which reduce ąuality uncertainty for 
consumers. Their analysis is of great importance for issues related to e.g. 
eco-labelling and its influence on the food supply chain. In Azevedo and 
Bankuti’s [2002] analysis the focus was on adverse effects of ąuality con- 
trol in the case of high transaction costs and inefficient “institutional gov- 
ernance”. Here the focus is on how institutions such as reputation for 
a private brand name and the public certification system for the PDO 
(Protected Denomination of Origin) products influence opportunities for 
opportunistic behaviour and the level of transaction costs and determine 
the governance structure. The fundamental difference between private 
reputation and the public certification system for PDO products is the en­
forcement mechanism. The ąuality assurance system of which private 
reputation is the basis is self-enforcing. In fact, a good name provides 
a signal to the customer about the ąuality of the product. The public cer­
tification system for the PDO relies on a ąuality label/certification and 
third-party enforcement by a public agency. It was argued earlier that the 
effects of ąuality labelling can be negative in the case of high transaction 
costs of complying and inefficient “institutional governance”. However, 
when “institutional governance” is efficient in the enforcement of ąuality, 
transaction costs decrease, as the possibilities for opportunistic behaviour 
(lying and cheating) [Molho, 1997] decrease, while the governance struc­
ture comes closest to a free market, putting downward pressure on prices.
Raynayd et al. argue that the choice of the governance structure de- 
pends on ąuality strategies by agents in the supply chain. Every food 
product goes through different stages of the logistic chain. For example, 
the supply chain of potatoes starts with seed companies. The potato is 
produced by farmers or agricultural companies, goes through different 
stages of processing, and reaches the consumer via the Wholesale and re- 
tail trade or via restaurants, etc. [Yakovleva and Flynn, 2004a, 16]. The 
finał ąuality of the product does not only depend on the person or firm 
that gives the product its brand name. Suppose that John sells his 
well-known brand of ecological fries. The ąuality of these fries depends 
on the seeds the farmers use, the way of growing the potatoes (in the 
case of cheese and milk, the feeding of cows), the way of harvesting the 
potatoes, the transport of the potatoes, processing, packaging, etc. Al-
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though the suppliers may promise to produce and process according to 
certain procedures, there exists the problem of opportunistic behaviour 
as suppliers may lower the ąuality (e.g. to reduce their costs) or delay 
supply. At such a moment, if John wants to guarantee the ąuality of his 
product and not reduce the value of his brand name, morę control is 
needed in the supply chain, especially of those agents who most influ­
ence the ąuality of the product, where specified rules for production have 
to be enforced and specific inputs may be used. Thus, the supplier needs 
to make specific investments in production especially for John (transac- 
tion-specific investment). At such a moment vertical integration may re- 
sult in reducing the problem of opportunistic behaviour. Governance 
structures tend to become morę hierarchical, reducing competition. An 
example is frozen fries producers contracting potato growing to farmers 
who contractually have to fulfil strict production conditions.
In the case of PDO this problem is less apparent. The official certifi- 
cate reduces the specificity of the brand name and as a result the possi- 
bilities for opportunistic behaviour. In such a case vertical integration in 
the supply chain is less likely to take place. Raynaud et al. emphasise 
that brand name cannot realistically play the role of a guarantee of ąual­
ity for smali firms. PDO may, from a transaction cost point of view, be 
the most attractive option for the many smali agricultural producers in 
a country such as Poland.
5. Investment, economic activity
and sustainable development
One of the conditions for achieving sustainable development is invest- 
ment in order to increase production and as a result income for people. 
An important ąuestion is how this can be done most effectively and in 
a sustainable way. Generally speaking, private firms have stronger in- 
centives for economic activity that other types of ownership, because of 
the direct interest of the owner in profit. One way to stimulate economic 
activity is reducing bureaucracy and limiting the amount of rules for 
companies, in order to lower transaction costs and to stimulate economic 
activity. “[F]irms would be morę productive if the government removed 
the rules and regulations that make entry and operation costly. 
[Rose-Ackerman, 2004, 333]” However, there are limits to such a policy. 
First of all, sińce economic activity should stimulate sustainable devel- 
opment, transaction costs for environmentally-unsound activities and 
other activities that lower welfare should not be reduced. Rules should 
exist to assure product ąuality and safety, worker safety, etc. Further-
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morę, as is argued in economic development theory, one ąuestion is 
whether an investment is labour-intensive or capital-intensive. Job-cre- 
ation is fundamental for sustainable development, as unemployment is 
one of the reasons for poverty. Thus, when an investment increases effi- 
ciency by saving labour, then new jobs should be created somewhere 
else. A problem exists in local agro-food systems in rural areas. Many 
jobs exist in the service sector, but most of these jobs are created in ur- 
ban areas. Thus, investment in the agro-food system should rather be la- 
bour-intensive or labour creating, as otherwise depopulation of rural ar­
eas and/or impoverishment may be the result.
In order to find a generał strategy, pilot projects may be a proper 
strategy. As Rose-Ackerman writes:
“Unresolved empirical issues limit the estimates of the relative cost- 
effectiveness of different strategies and the ways in which different alterna- 
tives interact. Thus an option may be better than the status quo, but not neces- 
sarily better than another proposed reform. Furthermore, some of the options 
have never been tried on a large scalę and have never been subject to system- 
atic efforts to measure their effectiveness. Thus, reformers need to design ex- 
periments and pilot programmes to test the value of options that appear prom- 
ising. [Rose-Ackerman, 2004, 336]”
It is important that projects which, among other things, aim at the im- 
provement of governance, should have a research component. This is 
needed in order to measure “progress (or its opposite) by providing Infor­
mation on background conditions, tracking the design and implementa- 
tion of reform and measuring outputs [Rose-Ackerman, 2004, 337-8].”
6. Concluding remarks
In this article the importance of setting priorities and governance in re- 
searching sustainable development in generał, and urban and rural 
agro-food systems as a factor of local sustainable development in particular, 
have been discussed. Analysis of governance structures and stakeholder in- 
terests may be a very important tool in identifying priorities for sustainable 
development and to implement desired changes. This should be accompa- 
nied by research on perception of issues of sustainable development in or­
der to create a common language, which may reduce the information and 
negotiation costs of developing and implementing sustainable changes.
A simple economic reason for setting priorities is the existence of scar- 
city. However, an important ąuestion to be researched is whether 
trade-offs between different goals are permissible, and if yes, to what ex- 
tent. This is relevant, as the market system sets priorities, which are of-
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ten not sustainable. Within the urban-rural context, an important ques- 
tion is whether development of poorer rural areas may be pursued at the 
expense of morę developed urban areas. However, within rural and ur- 
ban areas there are also distributive effects of change.
When setting priorities at the local level, an important issue is what 
priorities exist on the national level. Furthermore, local authorities often 
have limited competencies, while in former socialist countries it may be 
unclear which government agency or administrative unit is responsible 
for what. This not only makes the setting of priorities morę difficult, but 
also increases the transaction costs of change at the local level, as, in 
terms of property rights economics, property rights are poorly delineated, 
which weakens incentives for change. This is of particular importance 
as sustainable development possesses features of a public good (non- 
excludability and non-rivalry in consumption) and a merit good. Society 
as a whole gains, as the quality of life improves, but who is willing exert 
themselves if the benefits are distributed among a large group of free rid- 
ers? Thus, stimulating sustainable development, which nor maiły is al- 
ready a difficult thing, may become extremely difficult, due to unclear 
competencies which is accompanied by high transaction costs of change.
Good governance is of crucial importance in issues of sustainability. 
When the rules of the gamę are changed, organisational structures such 
as local governments, organisations representing different stakeholders, 
etc., have to implement these rules. As the case study on food quality 
shows, weak enforcement and high transaction costs may lead to ad- 
verse effects of measures to improve food quality. The existence of cor- 
ruption hampers sustainable development. Even when local government 
functions properly, a corrupt central government and/or judiciary com- 
plicates matters, increasing the transaction costs of and weakening in- 
centives for sustainable development. Analysis of which stakeholders 
gain and which lose, and how much, may be helpful in order to create 
a path of change which provides benefits to as many stakeholders as pos- 
sible, facilitating change (incentive-compatibility).
Finally, the relevance of pilot projects having a research component to 
finding sustainable investment opportunities has been discussed. Pilot 
projects are of particular relevance in explorative studies, when co-opera- 
tion with stakeholders is of great importance for the success of the project.
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